ABSTRACT: This article looks back to the first book imagining an "Asian cinema," which was published in Japan on the eve of Pearl Harbor. It then works through a history of the conception of Asian cinema, discovering fundamental continuities between national and transnational cinema studies and calling for a regionalization of film history.
Twenty years ago, as a wide-eyed graduate student interested in Asian cinema, I began systematically paging through the major Japanese language journals from the prewar era. I soon began to notice something very curious. There was a surprising mass of hard data and industry description in the mainstream press on Asian cinema, in addition to what had been published in film yearbooks and industrial newsletters. I spent considerable time collating data and tracking changes in industrial structures, national policies, and trends before getting sidetracked by a very different dissertation topic.
However, one trend particularly intrigued me, and I've often found myself thinking about its import. This was a steady process of interconnection across the region. In the first decades of the twentieth century, it was limited, yet noticeable, in most of Asia. Not surprisingly, this process was markedly stronger in colonial areas, where interconnection led to economic and industrial integration that intensified in the 1930s and early 1940s as Japanese imperialism took its disastrous course. It was in this period that Tokyo assumed its postearthquake shape through massive construction projects that reconfigured the city space, but this was also a moment when many in the Japanese film world turned their attention to other film capitals in the region. A new genre of writing on cinemawhat might be called "pan-Asian industrial film criticism"-appeared in conjunction with those developments, inaugurated in 1923 by Ishimaki Yoshio's On Motion Picture Economics.1 However, I want to focus on writing with a specifically regional perspective, concentrating on a different book-Ichikawa Sai's 1941 The Creation and Construction of Asian Cinema-in order to reconsider the creation and construction of Asian cinema in the present-day situation at the end of this essay. 2 Pan-Asian industrial criticism presents us with a tectonics of the region's cinema at a formative moment. Many of the structures this criticism bears were durable and are recognizable even today, although the differences are profound. Trolling through the journals, newsletters, yearbooks, and monographs of the period, one sees the same words popping up: sozo (creation) and, more interestingly, kensetsu (construction) and kosaku (building). They first appear in the industry rags and yearbooks. However, after the 1937 China Incident and the founding of the Manchurian Motion Picture Association (Manshu Eiga Kyokai), this brand of writing took firm hold in the mainstream film press (e.g., Kinema Junpo, Eiga Hyoron, Nihon Eiga, Eiga Junpo). It is at this moment in particular that this form of industrial analysis became a hybrid form of criticism, as writers increasingly evaluated films, filmmakers, and studios in their collective effort to imagine and construct "Asian cinema. " From this moment until the apocalyptic end of World War II, the major journals devoted a striking amount of ink to this industrial criticism. Indeed, by 1945, it was the only thing left standing when it crowded all other approaches out of the pages of Nihon Eiga, the last film journal given precious paper in the final months of the war. Nihon Eiga began its run in 1936 as a slick, glossy magazine with a wide variety of writing styles and formats; by 1945, it had devolved to little more than a thin pamphlet of industrial criticism distributed within the studios.
This writing is thick with data, lists, charts, and maps. There are even sumo-style banzuke rankings that map out relationships between people or institutions. The contemporary English-language press certainly had articles on foreign cinemas, but they did not show this affection for numbers and the accumulation of facts and data. Many of the Japanese authors were prominent film critics, high-ranking technocrats of studios and production companies, or administrators of government agencies. As the war intensified after 1937, there were similar articles by military officers, including those from the highest ranks, and the whole genre of writing took a strongly imperialistic cast. The war facilitated a new geographic imagining of Asian film, one that came to be informed by travel as filmmakers, critics, and bureaucrats visited captured and/or colonized territories.
This writing may not be as exciting to read as the sociological studies and theoretical musings of the likes of Gonda Yasunosuke and Nakai Masakazu, but it is truly a unique, untapped, and incredibly rich resource for the study of Asian cinema history. Today's generation of film scholars in North America and Europe is increasingly bi-and trilingual, and we can expect them to be diving into this archive. This is particularly true because, while twenty years ago all of this material was kept in either Japanese libraries or private collections, much of it is now easily accessed through handsome paper reprints, as well as the newly installed Makino Collection at Columbia University. To my knowledge the first substantial attempt to define "Asian cinema, " the Makino Collection offers an excellent example of a regional cinema imagined and constructed through study, travel, collection, and the dissemination of knowledge.
Ichikawa published his book a mere three weeks before the attack on Pearl Harbor. At a hefty 370 pages, it is a snapshot of the region's film system on the verge of total war. Thanks to a larger conversation about how to integrate Asia, it had now become possible to imagine an "Asian cinema. " At one level, the proof was in the films: aside from their host of pleasures, they embodied the emergence of a heady Asian cinematic modernity. These films were projected across the Asian region in every direction-if in uneven flows-and it is the future of this complex network of traffic that Ichikawa attempts to "imagine" and "construct. " (See fig. 1 .)
Ichikawa was a curious fellow, and we know something about him thanks to the research of Murayama Kyoichiro.3 He started his career working for Kobayashi Kisaburo at Kokkatsu, where he impressed his coworkers with his love of graphs and his ability to collect and organize data on the economics of cinema, with an eye for future strategizing.4 He left to lead a company called the International Film News Agency (Kokusai Eiga Tsushinsha, the publisher of his monograph), which had closely studied the world film industry since the company's establishment after the 1923 earthquake. Under Ichikawa's leadership, the International Film News Agency published a series of books on the film industry and then made its mark with publications like the daily Kokusai Eiga Tsushin, the monthly Kokusai Eiga Shinbun, and the International Film Yearbook. Ichikawa served as managing editor for these publications, which charted out the relationship of the Japanese industry with the rest of the world. Ichikawa himself contributed articles on the situations in Shanghai and the newly established Manchurian film industry, but after the 1937 China Incident, he seemed to become intensely interested in China, spending a third of his time on the continent.
The Creation and Construction of Asian Cinema represents the sum of his knowledge, describing in astounding detail the production, distribution, and exhibition systems of every industry in the region. The core of the book consists of close analyses of the industries of Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria, China, Hong Kong, French Indo-China, the Philippines, Siam, British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, India, Burma, Ceylon, Hawai'i, Australia, and New Zealand. Above, I mentioned that this amounted to a "snapshot" of Asian cinema. However, as I spent more time with this book, I realized that it was actually like a moving picture. That is, it offers data with both geographical and temporal dimensions, as Ichikawa constantly notes trends across the region. He analyzes the capitalization of industries, their competitive footing, distribution bottlenecks, and particular strengths and weaknesses. Hollywood typically accounted for 60 to 70 percent of all films shown in the region; at the same time, Ichikawa regularly points to flow within Asia. (Significantly, the distribution outside of Asia is almost exclusively to US West Coast diasporic communities.) He provides a complex mapping of the continent, one marked by two nodes: China and Japan. While these two industries dwarfed most of the other national outputs, size is only one factor among many.
Obviously, there is an ideological and geopolitical backdrop here and, in fact, Ichikawa is explicit about this. In the first few pages of his book, before wading into the substructures of Asian cinema, he writes:
One can basically resolve problems in foreign policy, military issues and politics through treaties. However, one can only grasp the heart of a people culturally . . . however, our country's cultural construction regarding the countries of Asia has, up to now, had no organization nor plan. Everything is done on the fly . . . It is necessary to use cinema to open the eyes of the great masses of people to the stirrings of the embryo of a new Asian culture rooted deeply in the feelings and lifestyles of the people. The first necessary step in grasping a true culture and feelings of the people (minshu) involves no other method than a dedicated culture construction (bunka kosaku) in the cinema.
This sets the stage for Ichikawa's unusual "moving picture" of Asian cinema in 1941. At the end of his book, he bares the political project underlying all the data collection:
There is one path on which Asian culture can proceed as Asian culture. That path involves the promotion of an Asian race consciousness and the pioneering of an independent power. With the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere taking root and liberating people from the national groupings of the past, we must grasp the future qualities of a racial consciousness built on a shared cultural basis. This is precisely the greatest of productive powers in Asian culture. Asian culture is not the mere transmission of Chinese and Indian culture, nor is it an imitation of the cultures of Europe and America. It is a new combination of the two, a glorious culture only in the cultural sphere of Asia. 5 Ichikawa argues that cinema is the prime medium for awakening this consciousness and constructing this interregional cultural sphere, concluding that this project must be led by the film worlds of Japan and China-the locations of the two film capitals, Tokyo and Shanghai. The other parts of Asia have such limited experience with production that these two giants of the region will have to take a leadership role in the creation of an Asian cinema for all the peoples of Asia. Now, it may seem surprising that an imperialist like Ichikawa includes China here, but one must remember the context of the China War. It was possible, or even necessary, to point to commonalities, if only to justify the invasion going on. I think it's also clear that Ichikawa was an enthusiastic Sinophile, and this probably moderated his sense for where Japan should be positioned vis-à-vis China. This was, in retrospect, an interesting moment between Matsuoka Yosuke's promulgation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in August 1940 (along with Kishi Nobusuke's New Order in September of that year) and the all-chips-in bet of Pearl Harbor. In this situation, China could be imagined less as a nation-state among equals than as a civilization to which Japan owed its cultural and historical DNA-but one that now "required" Japanese leadership in a modern world.
This hierarchical mapping of Japan at the apex of film culture was brought into crystal-clear focus with Pearl Harbor and the early military successes. Japan's leadership role in this scene was nominally certified by the step-by-step occupation or colonization of its neighbors, which lent Ichikawa's vaporous aspirations to build an Asian cinema the instrumental (if incomplete) power of management and a sense of grave responsibility. Thus, we can see all of this data collection as a form of control and discipline, not simply creation and construction. Not unlike the function of census efforts, which tabulate and order the messiness of the human world, making it easier to first understand-and then hegemonize-a people, the data collection of Ichikawa's outfit and many other government agencies, private businesses, study groups, and film journals was paving the way for the grand adventure culminating in WWII. This is particularly true as their data were embedded in various forms of critical writing.
At the same time, this first attempt to define Asian cinema, or imagine that there was such a thing, was a regionalism based on an Other (the USSR, US, and Germany). And while it was both imperially grand and thus incomplete in 1940, it is striking that Ichikawa's blueprint for the construction of Asian cinema was, to a significant degree, actually achieved thanks to the war that started only weeks after the publication of his book. As a medium capable of reaching masses, this regional formation benefited film producers-until it didn't. Studios were formed, films subsidized, producers empowered; and then, when the tides of war shifted, the studios and theaters were razed along with the cities, not to mention tens of millions of filmmakers and spectators.
In his book, as Ichikawa moves systematically from region to region, from kingdom to nation-state to colony, he repeatedly notes the impact that the China Incident had on the film business. Movie theaters were being lost, but markets were being gained, pioneered, and constructed. At the very same time, he examines how the new war in Europe was already impacting European production, access to raw stock, and imports into Asia. He notes that the wars were even interrupting American imports to some degree and speculates that this probably bodes well for Asian filmmakers' construction project.
Indeed, if we look at the industrial criticism of the subsequent years, it would appear that Ichikawa was prescient, because after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor and its invasion of vast swathes of Asia, the industrial criticism steadily increased in the pages of journals like Nihon Eiga and Eiga Junpo. In fact, by 1945, paper shortages precluded the publication of all but Nihon Eiga, which cut out all of the colorful star photographs, interviews, and film reviews, filling its pages with only data of instrumental use to a film industry in serious crisis. Looking at the industrial criticism during the Pacific War, particularly with the help of the newly reprinted, hand-written manuscript of the 1943-1945 Film Yearbook, 6 we can see that the war did indeed interrupt Hollywood's hegemony and give Ichikawa's fabulations of Asian cinema some measure of material reality. Between 1941 and 1942, all of Japan's exports to Europe, South America, and the Middle East ceased, only to be replaced by exports to new markets in Southeast Asia and the Pacific-exports that double between 1942 and 1943, thanks to all of the construction efforts on the ground-but before the war turned in favor of the United States. Revisiting Ichikawa's vision of Asian cinema over six decades later invites us to think about the present-day visioning of Asian cinema. As Prasenjit Duara has recently suggested, we appear to be in a new era of regionalism after a postwar era marked by obstinate and repressive nationalisms. We can chart the history of Asian cinema-and its figuration-against this backdrop.
For decades after the close of WWII, any pan-Asianism was tempered by the legacy of Japanese imperialism and the overwhelming power of bilateral relationships with the United States. Even the regionalism behind the spirit of the Bangdung Conference resulted in a collection of nonaligned (often dictatorial) nations that may have aligned, but never really integrated. The most prominent pan-Asian project in the film world was the Asian Film Festival (1954-present),7 whose participants essentially mirrored the self-interested behavior of their own nation-states, so the festival never amounted to much (despite its durability).8
Asian cinema made a slow but steady return in the late 1980s. This was coincident with and connected to the celebration of the Pacific Rim; however, this term never gained traction in the film world. One probable reason is that, as in Ichikawa's day, Asian cinema was still dominated both materially and imaginatively by a collection of cinematic city-states: Tokyo, Hong Kong, Beijing, and Mumbai. The only cinema city in the Pacific with any scale was Manila. Another reason was the lack of significant interconnection with the coasts of North and South America. The designation "Pacific Rim" made more sense to economists and political scientists than to filmmakers, critics, and scholars.
Nevertheless, a strong sense of regional dynamism took hold in the 1980s and 1990s. Festivals and film distributors duly noted the explosive pop cinemas of Hong Kong and India, the antiauthoritarian (35mm, 16mm, and Super-8) cinemas of the Philippines, the art-house treasures of Taiwan, and the astounding appearance of the Fifth Generation in communist China. Slots for this work on the international film festival circuit-which had heretofore concentrated on Japanese and Indian high art cinema-became obligatory. (1977-) in the 1990s, and finally to Busan (1996-). Minor festivals specializing in Asian cinema cropped up across the region. Fukuoka actually had two of them (1986-and 1991-), one directed by critic Sato Tadao. In the documentary arena, the Yamagata Documentary Film Festival was a regionalizing project from its first outing in 1989; it actually worked to integrate and network Asian filmmakers and exhibitors, an approach to an activist style of exhibition explicitly modeled by new documentary festivals in Taiwan, Korea, and India. Outside of the region, Asian specialty film festivals popped up all over the world, run by both fans and diasporic programmers.
Academia, moving at its typically slow pace, eventually caught up to these developments. The East-West Center, which ran the Hawai'i International Film Festival in the 1980s, held a lively annual conference on Asian cinema in conjunction with the main event. Other conferences followed, notably a 1988 conference at Ohio University.10 This was the first conference of the Asian Cinema Studies Society, which was founded in 1984. The society began publishing Asian Cinema Journal in 1995. It wasn't long before positions pegged specifically for Asian cinema appeared. My own school is a good barometer for this; the University of Michigan had courses on Kurosawa taught out of the English department, followed by visiting professorships by pioneer academics like Donald Richie and David Desser, and finally searched for what was akin to the first tenure-track position in Asian cinema in 1995. A decade and a half on, such positions are commonplace.
During this very same period, books on Asian cinema began appearing. The early-1990s volumes often sported connections to the Hawai'i International Film Festival and its conference. John Lent, one of the early leaders of the Asian Cinema Studies Society, published his encyclopedic The Asian Film Industry in 1990,11 and a reader-a sure sign that a field has taken root-appeared in 2006. 12 The publishing of regional studies has markedly intensified in subsequent years. Finally, Asian cinema panels have greatly increased at the Society for Cinema and Media Studies; furthermore, national cinema panels greet audiences studying all areas of Asia. A community has formed, if still marked by the subregionalizations of South, Southeast, and East. It is at these panels that one palpably senses an increasing integration of Asian cinema studies.
At the same time, it is notable that most panels and books are configured in a national cinema mode. This should surprise us since the critiques promulgated by the concept of "transnational cinema"-which became fashionable starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s-were supposed to shatter the national cinema model. Transnational cinema studies critiqued checkered historical connections to the reflectionist and culturalist historiographies of old-school area studies, which were in turn compatible with the pedagogical ideology of the nation-state system. Research based on bounded categories-whether geographical, linguistic, aesthetic, and so on-was to give way to an emphasis on borderlessness and flux. This is, of course, deeply connected to the vicissitudes of late capital, with its massive diasporas and flexible citizenship, effortless transportation of goods and capital across political borders, concomitant collapsing of physical distances, new technologies for cheap and instantaneous global communication, and neoliberal policies serving the deterritorializing nature of capitalism. Cinema thus went from a stable expression of national character to one medium among many navigating the "flow, " "flux, " and "incessant movement" of a borderless, globalizing world. An impressive body of work was published along these lines. However, there was also something rather unsatisfying about the rubric of "transnational cinema studies. " For one thing, it ultimately put little distance between its own methodology and that which it critiqued. True, the earlier era of scholars-Donald Richie, for example, in the case of Asian cinema-searched for and predictably discovered culturally particular deployments of the universalized technology of cinema, which these scholars speciously attributed to a putative national identity (or even something more ancient, the predisposition of such nationalist discourses). Transnational cinema studies launched a powerful and convincing critique of these approaches; at the same time, and in an uncannily similar fashion, it merely searched for and (predictably) discovered traces of transnational flow in cinematic texts. This is to say, transnational film studies has suffered from its own celebration of light-rootedness and effortless flow.
Film has a special relationship to processes of globalization, which we can trace to the beginnings of the medium. For one thing, there is its cost. As one of the most expensive art forms, it is deeply dependent on large, stable institutions with complex, expensive, and relatively immobile physical plants, not to mention corporations that have historically organized themselves within a national context. Furthermore, this scale, combined with its power to reach mass audiences, has meant unusually intense scrutiny and regulation by the nation-state (quota systems, censorship apparatuses), and often subvention by national coffers. Similarly, labor forces are often unionized and far less mobile than globalization rhetoric would suggest.
Connected to this, and just as crucial, is the issue of language. As I argue in Cinema Babel, film is a product unusually dependent on translation.13 Toys, chemicals, auto parts, and the like can be manufactured in rural China and distributed globally through the easy translation of labels and packaging, effectively domesticating a given product. Cinema is easily dubbed and subbed, but both methods result in a product compromised by what Koichi Iwabuchi has called the "cultural odor" of its origin.14 Language and the "imperfection" of film translation constitute a strong element of friction in the transnational circulation of cinema. This is why the most compelling examples of transnational media study are of music (which can be listened and danced to without access to the lyrics) or literature (where a new text cleanly displaces the original). "Cultural odor" can also be an attractive fragrance; however, in the case of subtitled or dubbed films, it is more often than not an (expensive) impediment to flow across linguistic frontiers. Unfortunately, transnational film studies uses translation as a fairly straightforward trope for the symptomology of transnational flow, whereas it should commit itself to a rigorous accounting of linguistic translation itself-as translingual practice. 15 To do so would lead to a regionalization of Asian film studies, a shift I believe is well underway. In this, I am in agreement with Prasenjit Duara, whose recent article "Asia Redux: Conceptualizing a Region for Our Times" positions a reconfigured regionalism as "an intermediate zone between the deterritorializing impulses of capitalism and the territorial limits of nationalism. "16 Duara points to a situation after a long twentieth century of national identifications bound by hard borders-a new conception of space where the nation-state itself acknowledges both regional and global interdependence, softening or sloughing off pedagogical homogenizations of putative national culture. Of Asian regionalization, he writes, [A]s I have argued, actual interdependence has increased dramatically, and so has cultural contact. Interdependence, however, is being managed by ad hoc arrangements and specialized transnational institutions with little possibility of large-scale state-like coordination and control. In this sense, region formation in Asia is a multipath, uneven, and pluralistic development that is significantly different from European regionalization. Moreover, the region has no external limits or territorial boundaries and does not seek to homogenize itself within . . . In addition to founding the call for heterogeneity and plurality of homelands on textual, imaginative, and psychological grounds, I wish to emphasize our interdependence as necessary for our survival and even for individual flourishing. We need to recognize our interdependence and foster transnational consciousness in our education and cultural institutions, not at the expense but for the cost of our national attachments.17
Two decades of vigorous critique have shown the durability of the national cinema paradigm for film history. At the same time, and through this critique, the paradigm has substantially transformed since the end of the Cold War. We attend to regional, global, and local dimensions of national cinema study, rejecting categories of absorption, rejection, and hierarchization; rather, today it is about interreferentiality, interconnection, and encounter. This presents to us a tripartite historiography. First, there was the imperial imagining and constructing of an Asian cinema in Ichikawa's time. This was followed by the postwar, post-Bandung efforts of the Cold War, where any regional energies fell into tension with centripetal conceptions of national cinema and the power of bilateral relationships with the United States or Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, we are now experiencing a shift to a new regionalization in Asia, one that is inspiring a new era of industrial criticism.
The least persuasive studies in this vein offer little more than data-driven industrial description or fail to depart from the simple symptomology of transnational film studies. Of all the new regional scholarship, one book offers a compelling example of what is possible. Emilie Yueh-yu Yeh and Darrell Davis's East Asian Screen Industries is a fascinating rethinking of East Asian cinema. This book effortlessly combines descriptions of industrial structures with smart intellectual history, deft textual analysis attending to genres and style, attention to reception contexts, and careful acknowledgment of the creative agency of producers and artists. Their work unknowingly harks back to Ichikawa Sai's The Creation and Construction of Asian Cinema, but unlike Ichikawa, Yeh and Davis self-consciously account for the ideological dimensions of their own approach. It is a model for us all.
As Yeh and Davis's work powerfully demonstrates, the shift to a regionalization of film studies has already begun-in the halls of the Society for Cinema and Media Studies, in theaters the world over, and in the many writings on Asian cinema-whether the focus is on a single national (or linguistic) context, or whether there is an aspiration to foreground Asia as a region. We have come a long way since Ichikawa Sai's time. Today, as film migrates to a multitude of screens, we are witnessing a new imagining and constructing of Asian cinemathe contours of which we are only now beginning to see.
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